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Key Messages
•

•

•

•

•

Nigeria is in trouble: its oil dependency is not sustainable. The country’s oil has lost its competitiveness and oil
prices tend to remain below its production cost. Nigeria’s
inefficient refineries are draining public money. Public
and private debt in Nigeria is indexed on oil prices. The
country’s sovereign debt rating was downgraded in March
2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and could be
downgraded further if low oil prices are sustained as expected by rating agencies. These circumstances tend to
compromise Nigeria’s ability to borrow to face the challenges of the health, economic, and climate crises.
Moreover, the oil industry is now one of the worst-performing sectors in the financial market. Hit hard by the
current COVID-19 crisis, the industry is affected by pessimistic scenarios on the return of demand and prices to
past levels, putting oil-producing countries in dangerous
economic, financial, and political situations. In the post–
Paris Agreement world, marked by the low-carbon energy
transition, renewables play a leading role, whereas the
prominence of oil is set to diminish. As the world moves
forward, the industry is a reminder of the past.
The oil crisis looms large in Nigeria due to the country’s
heavy dependence on revenues from the sector. Revenues from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
(NNPC) can represent more than five times the country’s
health expenditure, nearly seven times its foreign aid receipts, and more than fifteen times the value of the country’s sovereign wealth fund. Because of the scale of NNPC
revenues, the Nigerian government’s largest spending decisions are associated with the oil sector rather
than the low-carbon energy transition and associated
public goods.
Various national governments have had differing and apparently mutually exclusive objectives for their national
oil companies (NOCs): maximizing fiscal revenues transferred to the country’s treasury; achieving commercial
effectiveness to extend the company’s oil portfolio; delivering public goods and services; providing public employment, infrastructure or energy; or promoting the local private sector. The climate change agenda and the COVID-19
crisis force a reconciliation of these objectives: no NOC
will be able to maximize fiscal transfers or commercial
effectiveness without embracing the energy transition,
which in turn represents the most critical public service
to be delivered to citizens. Thus, NNPC’s business model
must embrace the energy transition.
Other NOCs have taken meaningful steps to become players in the low-carbon energy transition domestically or
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internationally. Five NOCs, in particular, have stepped
up research and investment in renewables; green hydrogen; and carbon capture, utilization, and storage
(CCUS) technology, while targeting a reduction of their
carbon footprint: Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco, Norway’s
Equinor, Brazil’s Petrobras, Malaysia’s Petronas, and Algeria’s Sonatrach. While COVID-19 has hastened Nigeria’s
oil decline, it also creates an opportunity to advance the
energy transition, leveraging NNPC as a key player of its
realization, similarly to Algeria, Brazil, Malaysia, Norway,
and Saudi Arabia.
•

The five NOCs approach the energy transition differently and with different ambitions, and their climate governance framework is not always clear or elaborated. Even
so, they have made the energy transition core to their
strategies. They address the transition risk and seize the
transition opportunities in a meaningful way, supporting
their national governments’ commitments under the Paris Agreement.

•

The five NOCs have also undergone reforms of various
aspects of their corporate governance. Even if not always
sufficient, these reforms position them to be players of
the energy transition.

•

The Nigerian government has started diversifying out
from oil, and there are some signs that NNPC is embracing governance reforms and could help the government in
achieving its ambition to participate in the energy transition. However, much more is needed to ensure that NNPC
uses the energy transition as a business and development
opportunity. This is an extraordinary task that only a well
governed NNPC can take up.

Critical reform efforts should focus on:
•

Hiring expertise to develop an energy transition plan for
Nigeria and run an institutional analysis of the role to be
played by each key public or private institution in the energy transition including NNPC.

•

Reforming NNPC to ensure it can play this role, by:
o

making NNPC independent from political interference at all operational and management levels, reducing opportunities for corruption,

o

enshrining transparency and internal as well as external oversight in NNPC’s governance framework,

o

legally clarifying its funding mechanism and revenue
retention model,

o

institutionalizing principles of climate change governance,

Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition

o

if profound reform is not feasible for lack of political
champions inside the government or within NNPC, a
better avenue would be to privatize NNPC or at least
some of its subsidiaries.

•

Setting up a separate division of NNPC or, in case of NNPC
privatization, an independent entity with clear objectives
related to the energy transition that are measured by
transparent and auditable metrics. This division or entity
would be in charge of developing a timeline to eliminate
routine flaring and minimize non routine venting and flaring for existing fields; developing criteria to award new
fields in accordance with a stranded asset risk analysis;
and establishing carbon emission standards.

•

Identifying funding sources for this new division or entity
in advance and in ways that incentivize desired results.

The current crisis is a moment for reform on which Nigeria
and NNPC should embark. While it is an incredible policy and
political challenge, it is not unsurmountable. Other NOCs are
showing the way, and policy guidance is already out there to
guide countries and companies.
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1. Introduction
The fossil fuel industry is in trouble. Fossil fuels are responsible for more than 65% of human-made global warming, and
two-thirds of known reserves need to be left underground and
be stranded.1 While 20 years ago oil and gas companies dominated the financial market, today they are being displaced
by technology companies, nearly disappearing from the S&P
500,2 which evidences the decline of the industry. The competitiveness of renewable energy has now been established, and
the energy demand is on trend to shift permanently to clean
and modern sources of energy.
The economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic is the latest blow inflicted on the oil industry.3 All scenarios anticipate that oil price levels will not return to historical
trends, and some even predict that oil prices will not return to
pre-COVID-19 levels.
Consequently, Nigeria is also in trouble given its heavy dependence on oil revenues. The Nigerian government cannot rely
on these revenues to finance its stimulus package to keep the
economy afloat during the COVID-19 crisis and most likely will
not be able to rely on them for the recovery and beyond, given that Nigeria’s oil is not competitive enough at today’s oil
price levels.
It is time for Nigeria to embrace the low-carbon energy transition and diversify out of the oil and gas industry before it
sinks. The Nigerian government has started to make efforts
in that direction. In June 2020, it removed the price cap for
gasoline and associated subsidies4 and established the goal
to increase renewable energy power generation to 30% of the
installed capacity by 2030. Also, by 2030, the country plans to
have 5.3 GW of mini-grids (up from 1 MW in 2015) and 2.8 GW
of solar home systems (up from 30 MW in 2015).5

6 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

In particular, Nigeria needs to rethink the role of its National
Oil Company (NOC)—the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)—to support this ambition, turning critical and
challenging times into an opportunity for both the company
and the country. The government already anticipated this role
in 2005 by requiring NNPC to open the renewable energy division.6 This entity or a separate one with similar mandate, now
needs to be given the means to play a strategic role.
Other NOCs have taken meaningful steps to become players
in the energy transition domestically or internationally. We review the energy transition strategies adopted and measures
taken by Algeria’s Sonatrach, Brazil’s Petrobras, Malaysia’s
Petronas, Norway’s Equinor, and Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco. Their experience can serve as a source of guidance and inspiration for Nigeria’s reform of NNPC, even though they must
also make significant progress to align with the trajectory required by the Paris Agreement.
Becoming a player in the energy transition and supporting
governments in achieving the Paris Agreement will entail shifting the business model of these companies over time, which
is always a strategic and operational challenge that only well
governed companies can take on successfully. To this end, we
also analyze the corporate governance structures of these five
NOCs and compare them to that of NNPC to draw lessons.
The current crisis is a moment for reform on which Nigeria
and NNPC should embark. While it is an incredible policy and
political challenge, it is not unsurmountable. Other NOCs are
showing the way, and policy guidance is already out there to
guide countries and companies.

Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition

2. The Low-Carbon Transition and
COVID-19 Crisis: Hastened Fall of
the Oil and Gas Sector and Rise of
Renewable Energies
In 2019, the energy sector—composed mostly of oil and gas
companies—was the worst-performing one on the S&P 500
index. In 1980 the energy industry accounted for 25% of the
index’s value (with 7 out of the 10 top companies being oil and
gas companies),7 while as of July 2020 oil and gas companies
accounted only for 2.8% of the index8 (Figure 1). In August
2019, Exxon Mobil’s weight in the S&P 500 index dropped to
1%, dropping out of the top 10 companies.9 In fact, no oil and
gas company remains in the top 10.
Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused an unprecedented global crisis, with lower oil prices and, for one day,
even negative future prices.10 Even after the global economy
restarts and under optimistic scenarios, oil prices are expected to recover to pre-COVID-19 prices in 2021 or 2022 at a USD
50/bbl. to USD 60/bbl. range. Under another scenario, that

price level will be reached in 2024. In a pessimistic scenario,
prices do not return to past levels.11
The oil industry will face a challenging macroeconomic environment with a predicted decline in global demand for hydrocarbons from 2030 onward due to the low-carbon energy
transition,12 which represents “significant business and credit
risk” for oil companies.13 Even in the Middle East, where oil is
low cost and abundant, some governments have made the
energy transition the strategic priority. Saudi Arabia recently
tripled its renewable energy target, and the United Arab Emirates launched its “Energy Plan 2050,” aiming to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 70%, improve energy efficiency by 40%,14
and reach a 50% stake in clean energy by 2050.15
Bloomberg NEF forecasts that renewable energy sources
could meet half of the world’s energy demand by 2050.16 Today solar energy represents 2% of global electricity generation and wind 5%; by 2050 solar could rise to 22% and wind to
26% (Figure 2). Dramatic technological advances in batteries
and energy storage accompany this development. Bloomberg
NEF estimates that USD 13.3 trillion will be invested in new
power generation assets by 2050, with renewables account-

Figure 1: Oil and gas industry
underperformance vs S&P 500
Source: McKinsey.42
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ing for 77% of this investment.17 The main enabler of this shift
is the radical drop in cost of solar and wind energy, making
these technologies more competitive than fossil fuels on a
non-subsidized basis.18 Moreover, new technological advances, continuous economies of scale, and competition continue
to reduce the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for wind and
solar energy. In late 2019, electricity costs from new solar photovoltaic (PV) plants were 83% lower than ten years earlier.19

2.1. Implications of the Oil Crisis for Nigeria

Renewable energy investments also provide for a higher job
multiplier than fossil fuels. Every USD 1 million in spending in
energy infrastructure generates “7.49 full-time jobs in renewables infrastructure, 7.72 in energy efficiency, but only 2.65 in
fossil fuels.”20

Approximately ten years ago, Nigeria was among the most
valuable countries by net present value (NPV) for Shell’s global upstream portfolio but today it’s ranked fifth. It also has
slipped in the rankings for Chevron and Eni and hardly makes
it to the top 10 of ExxonMobil’s upstream portfolio. Only Total still considers Nigeria among its top three countries for investment. As a consequence, few of the deep-water prospects
have been developed. The main reason is related to production costs. In ten years, global deep-water project costs have
fallen by 50% and averaged less than USD 10/boe for 2018
financial investment decisions. Currently, costs of Nigeria’s
deep-water pre-financial investment decision projects are
among the highest in the world (Figure 3).22

In a post-COVID-19 reality and with the low-carbon energy
transition, lower oil prices and the demise of the global oil
sector, oil-producing countries, including Nigeria, could face
a dangerous financial situation.21

Nigeria’s oil dependency is not sustainable as the country’s oil
has lost its competitiveness against international oil companies and oil prices tend to remain below production costs.
2.1.1. Nigeria’s Oil Is No Longer Competitive

Figure 2: Global power generation mix (1970–2050)
Source: Bloomberg NEF.43
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This decline in investment attractiveness is reflected in the
latest ranking of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), showing that Nigeria has had the lowest per capita revenue from oil exports every year in the past
20 years.23
Oil price crashes due to the COVID-19 crisis could delay investment further.24 The Nigerian government has changed its original benchmark of USD 57 per barrel for the 2020 budget to
USD 30 per barrel, responding to the oil price crash.25 With production costs above the long-term oil price that may stabilize
around 40 USD/boe,26 Nigeria will see more high-cost project
shut-ins and the failure of the government’s plan to reach an
increasing daily production of 3 million barrels.27 Even in an
optimistic scenario, oil prices will hardly bounce back to cover
the Nigerian deficit.
Furthermore, Nigeria’s cost structure has alarmed its legislators. According to Senator Adeola, “while cost of oil production in Saudi Arabia is USD 4 per barrel and USD 3 per barrel in
Russia, it is USD 21.2 per barrel in Nigeria, indicating very poor
marginal profit of about USD 3 per barrel based on the new oil
price benchmark of USD 25 per barrel.”28

Nigeria’s capacity to refine and process crude oil also remains
behind. The country’s refining capacity is significantly low (capacity utilization at 8.67%) and therefore cannot process the
oil produced. The country must then import refined oil from
other markets, putting the national economy at risk due to exchange rate shocks.29
2.1.2.

Nigeria’s Economy is Dangerously Dependent on Oil
and NNPC’s Oil Revenues

Nigeria’s economy is dependent on oil, which accounted for
95% of the country’s exports in 2019. In 2019, oil revenues represented 52.7% of government revenues.30
Moreover, Nigeria depends considerably on NNPC’s oil sales
revenues. In 2013, a high price year, funds collected from
NNPC made up 74% of government revenues, and between
2011 and 2017 this number ranged between 45% and 74%.31
In 2015, NNPC’s sales revenues were more than 5 times the
country’s health expenditure, nearly 7 times its foreign aid
receipts, and more than 15 times the value of the country’s
sovereign wealth fund (Figure 4).32

Figure 3: Nigeria’s PreFinancial Investment Decision
Projects
Source: Wood Mackenzie,
2018.44
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NNPC transfers only part of its revenues to the government,
keeping the rest for operations and investment at its discretion and bypassing the budgetary processes; at the same
time, NNPC still needs government approval to pay for cash
calls (see Section 4.1.3).33 NNPC’s reinvestment in its traditional core activities represents an opportunity cost, as every dollar spent by NNPC on oil—rather than being spent by the government on green investments—delays Nigeria’s energy transition and deepens its oil dependency. Because of the scale
of NNPC’s spending needs, the Nigerian government’s largest
spending decisions are associated with the oil sector rather
than the energy transition and associated public goods.
In addition, public and private debt is indexed on oil prices. NNPC suffers from long-term liabilities accumulated in
opaque conditions, while by the end of 2019, the oil and
gas sector “represented about 30% of Nigerian banks’ gross
loans.”34.A decrease in oil price and the associated closure of
oil fields represent a systemic risk for the country, at least in
the short term, until the country’s macroeconomic environment and fiscal pace is decoupled from the oil price.

Because Nigeria’s economy is so dependent on oil, Nigeria is
expected to experience currency devaluation and prolonged
recession. The oil price slump, the current macroeconomic
climate, and the pressure resulting from the COVID-19 crisis
will affect the country’s indebtedness and payment capacity.
For example, Nigerian banks’ credit profiles are expected to
worsen as their assets deteriorate with high exposure to the
oil sector.35
Nigeria’s sovereign debt rating was downgraded in March
2020 in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and could be
downgraded further if the low oil prices are sustained as expected by rating agencies.36 This compromises Nigeria’s ability to borrow to face the challenges of the health, economic,
and climate crises.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has already warned
that Nigeria “is considerably less prepared to tackle this [oil
price] slump as gross domestic product has shrunk by almost
a third in five years. The economy had been projected to grow
2.5% this year, slower than its population, until the coronavirus tipped it into a likely recession.”37

Figure 4: NNPC and Nigeria –
comparison
Source: NRGI.45
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2.2. Implications of the Oil Crisis for National
Oil Companies
A major challenge during and after the COVID-19 crisis for
National Oil Companies (NOC) will come from governments
being pressured to reallocate budgetary resources from their
oil companies for investments in health, education, and fiscal
stimulus to reactivate the economy.38 Given that oil revenues
make up a critical component of national budgets, this pressure is being passed on to NOCs, in particular those that have
a high cost of production and struggle with low oil prices—
which is precisely the current situation of Nigeria’s NNPC.39
Even so, a forward-looking government could seize the momentum to turn the crisis into an opportunity to overhaul the
NOC’s contribution to the country and turn it into a leader of
the energy transition.
Various governments have had differing and apparently mutually exclusive objectives for their NOCs: maximizing fiscal
revenues transferred to the country’s treasury; achieving
commercial effectiveness to extend the company’s oil portfolio; delivering public goods and services; providing public
employment, infrastructure or energy; or promoting the local
private sector.40 The climate change agenda and the COVID-19
crisis reconcile all these objectives: no NOC will be able to
maximize fiscal transfers or commercial effectiveness without
embracing the energy transition, which in turn represents the
most critical public service to be delivered to citizens.
Many national governments are full owners or majority
shareholders of NOCs that jointly make up approximately half of global oil reserves.41 If operated efficiently, NOCs
can help countries ensure a smooth decarbonization and
play an important role in achieving the Paris Agreement on
climate change.
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3. Energy Transition Strategies of Selected
NOCs and Lessons Learned for NNPC
This section takes a deep dive into the decarbonization strategy of five NOCs that have stepped up research and investment in renewables, green hydrogen, and carbon capture
and storage (CCS) technology while targeting a reduction of
their carbon footprint: Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco, Norway’s
Equinor, Brazil’s Petrobras, Malaysia’s Petronas, and Algeria’s
Sonatrach. While COVID-19 has hastened Nigeria’s oil decline,
it also creates an opportunity to attain the energy transition,
leveraging NNPC as a key player of its realization, similarly to
Algeria, Brazil, Malaysia, Norway, and Saudi Arabia.
The Climate Accountability Institute ranks the top 20 companies by carbon dioxide emissions since 1965; 12 of them are
NOCs, Saudi Aramco ranks 1st with 4.38% of global emissions;
Sonatrach ranks 18th with 0.91%; and Petrobras ranks 20th
with 0.64%.46
Three of the five reviewed NOCs—Saudi Aramco, Equinor, and
Petrobras—are part of the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI)
and in May 2020 along with their peers (BP, Chevron, CNPC,
Eni, Exxon Mobil, Occidental, Repsol, Shell, and Total) reiterated their commitment to “reducing emissions; implementing
and scaling-up of innovative low carbon solutions; advancing
opportunities to scale up commercially viable, environmentally responsible, and safe carbon capture, use and storage;
and supporting governments as they design efficient policies
that can accelerate energy transitions.” 47
The five assessed NOCs approach the energy transition differently and with different ambitions, but they have all made it
core to their strategies. While their climate governance framework is not always clear or elaborated, they are all addressing
the transition risk and seizing the transition opportunities in
a meaningful way. All five NOCs are supporting their national
government’s commitment to achieve the NDCs. In the sections that follow, we compare the various elements of their
strategies to NNPC’s.

in that business; entering the business of renewable energy
production; earning certified emission reduction (CER) credits under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDMs); and participating in global carbon emission
reduction initiatives.48
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
The Transition Pathway Initiative (TPI) measures companies’
performance in levels of sophistication and effectiveness of
their climate governance frameworks. In particular, the initiative measures whether a company has acknowledged climate
change as a business issue (level 1), has built internal capacities to set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and is
transparent on scopes 1 and 2 (level 2), has integrated them
into operational decision making (level 3), and has brought
climate change to the core of its strategy assessment (level 4).
(See Annex for the complete TPI questionnaire). 49
TPI has assessed both Equinor and Petrobras. The other three
companies analyzed here—Petronas, Saudi Aramco, and
Sonatrach—have reported neither to TPI nor to CDP (formerly
the Carbon Disclosure Project), an alternative framework to
assess climate governance.
Equinor holds level 4 (strategic level) by achieving the following: setting long-term quantitative targets for reducing its
greenhouse gas emissions, remunerating senior executives on
the basis of climate change performance, incorporating climate change risks and opportunities in its strategy, undertaking climate scenario planning, disclosing an internal price of
carbon, and ensuring consistency between its climate change
policy and the positions taken by trade associations of which
it is a member.50

NNPC

Petrobras holds level 3, meaning that it has integrated the
management of greenhouse gas emissions and of risks and
opportunities related to the low-carbon transition into its
operational decision making. However, it still has some challenges such as supporting domestic and international efforts
to mitigate climate change (level 3), remunerating senior executives based on climate change performance, incorporating
climate change risks and opportunities in their strategy, and
ensuring consistency between its climate change policy and
the positions taken by trade associations of which it is a member (level 4).51

NNPC’s climate governance framework is uncertain. In 2005,
following a presidential directive, NNPC opened a Renewable
Energy Division (RED), with the vision of becoming a leader in
renewable energy business toward a low-carbon economy.
The RED was set up with the following objectives: engaging in
the production of biofuels and becoming a dominant player

Lacking a detailed TPI assessment, the Petronas Carbon Commitments document provides information on the company’s
climate governance framework. These commitments include
zero continuous flaring and venting of hydrocarbon in the
design of new upstream and downstream facilities and projects; zero continuous venting and reduction of continuous

3.1. Climate Governance Framework
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flaring in existing operations when feasible; a carbon price
in project-decision making together with the option of carbon offsets where economically feasible; the incorporation
of carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technologies at the design phase for high-CO2 field development; and
the consideration of adopting renewable energy technologies in all facilities and projects where operationally and
economically feasible.52

3.2. Addressing Transition Risks

For Saudi Aramco and Sonatrach, there is little information
on their climate governance frameworks. For Saudi Aramco,
more information should become available with its listing
on the Saudi stock exchange. At the minimum, we know that
Saudi Aramco acknowledges climate change as a pressing
issue53 and a risk to its operations.54 Moreover, since 2018
Saudi Aramco’s greenhouse gas emissions have been verified and certified by an external party.55 As for Sonatrach, it
has committed to expand its capabilities in renewable energies to support the Algerian government 56 and to improve its
energy efficiency.57

NNPC

Addressing the transition risk means anticipating government
policies that will penalize high-carbon content in operations,
in line with the country’s commitment to the Paris Agreement.
A transition strategy needs ambitious targets on carbon intensity reduction, ideally aligned with science-based targets.58

NNPC lacks a strategy to address the transition risk and decrease the carbon intensity of its production while its carbon
intensity on scopes 1 and 2 is above the global average (see
Figure 5).
While the quantity of associated gas flared decreased from
2,742 mmscfd or 64% of the produced associated gas in 2001
to 19% or 880 mmscfd in 2018 (Figure 6), it remains very high
by international standards—the global average is 1.1%59—
contributing to making Nigeria the world’s 7th flaring country
in 2018.60 In addition, there is accounting of underreporting
of flaring.61

Figure 5: Emission Intensity of Oil Production and Processing in Selected Countries
Source: IEA, Oil Climate Index, Carnegie Endowment, Capterio analysis105
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Figure 7 shows the companies that flared the highest volume
of associated gas in 2018. Many of these assets are under JV
contracts with NNPC.
The 178 gas flare sites in the Niger Delta flare around 1 billion
scf of gas, which could satisfy more the needs of the current
power generation and domestic industry.62 Therefore, failing
to eliminate flaring is not only an environmental issue but also
a missed economic opportunity.63 As the majority equity holder in joint ventures (JV) or concessionaire in production sharing contracts, NNPC should drive the investment to end gas
flaring. This investment is substantive and means maximizing
the opportunity of CO2 use in enhanced oil recovery, using gas
to power current oil fields and developing additional functioning and reliable gas infrastructure in Nigeria and Western
Africa.64 The Nigerian government set a 2020 flare-out target
date (10 years before that of the World Bank’s initiative that
Nigeria endorsed),65 and NNPC and its JV partners might incur
penalties for non-compliance.66

Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
Although all five NOCs analyzed here have committed to reducing their carbon intensity, they do not always have targets
or ambitious enough targets. All of them do have 2030 as a
flare-out date; this date has been established by the World
Bank’s Zero Routine Flaring by 2030 Initiative, that all reviewed NOCs, but Petronas, endorsed.67
Equinor’s strategy, even though it is the most comprehensive
and aggressive one among the NOCs analyzed, is still not on
par with what is required to achieve the Paris Agreement.68
The strategy involves targets on reducing the carbon intensity of its operations and its value chain by 2050. Equinor aims
to achieve carbon-neutral operations and eliminate routine flaring by 2030, reducing absolute emissions in Norway
to near zero by 2050; for the value chain it aims at reducing
the net carbon intensity from the energy produced to energy
consumed by at least 50% by 2050 (Figure 8).69 Equinor has
a company-wide upstream flaring intensity target of 0.2% by
2020 for the operated assets and a zero routine flaring target by 2030 at the latest. In Norway’s operations, there is no
routine flaring.70

Figure 6: Associated Gas
Produced and Flared,
2001–2018
Source: Department of
Petroleum Resources
(DPR).107

Figure 7: Total Gas Flared
by Company
Source: Department of
Petroleum Resources
(DPR).106
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In the last decade (2009–2019), Petrobras reduced the volume
of emissions by more than 40% and aims at reducing its carbon intensity even more by 2025 to reach 15 kg CO2e/boe in
exploration and production and 36 kg CO2e/CWT in refining.71
In 2019, Petrobras reduced its flared gas by 12% as compared
to 2018 and targets zero routine flaring by 2030.72 The carbon
intensity of Petrobras’s operations is among the lowest of all
oil and gas companies.73 Even so, as is the case for Equinor,
this intensity still exceeds what is needed to achieve the
Paris Agreement.74
Petronas reduced its carbon footprint by 13%, from 56.50
million tCO2e in 2017 to 49 million tCO2e in 2018; it aims
at zero continuous venting by 2024 and zero continuous
flaring by 2030, while not specifying a target for overall
emissions reduction. 75
Sonatrach reported a 2% reduction of flared gas in 2018 compared to 2017 levels, and a 3% reduction compared to 2014.
The flaring rate is now at 5%, and the goal is to reach less than
1% of gas production in 2021.76 However, like Petronas, Sonatrach does not have a target for overall emissions reduction.
Saudi Aramco’s direct and indirect emissions have decreased
between 2017 and 2018, showing improvement in energy intensity: reductions of 4% in direct emissions, 10% in indirect
emissions, and 3.6% in energy intensity. The flaring intensity
also dropped by 4% from 2018 to 2019;77 flaring intensity is
now at less than 1%.78

3.3. Seizing the Transition Opportunity
All five NOCs are turning the climate change imperative into
a business opportunity, and three of them—Equinor, Petronas, and Sonatrach—even contemplate shifts in business
models anchored in strategies to substantially increase the
share of renewable energy installed capacity in their portfolios. To seize the transition opportunity, NOCs may (1) build
on their competitive advantages, (2) aim at transforming
the market by pioneering and demonstrating solutions, and
(3) dedicate a sizeable R&D budget and venture capital to
low-carbon solutions.
3.3.1. Building Competitive Advantages
NNPC
NNPC’s RED builds on NNPC’s existing capacity in making
oil products to specialize in biofuels. It has launched an automotive biofuel program for the production of ethanol and
biodiesel that would be blended with conventional fuels and
has mobilized agriculture crop fields for the production of biofuels.79 NNPC’s RED is also developing plans for on-grid and
off-grid solar energy PV technology, for deployment in retail
stations and NNPC facilities. NNPC’s RED is doing data gathering for CDM Opportunities in the Oil and Gas Sector as well in
the solar sector.80

Figure 8: Equinor carbon intensity
reduction
Source: Equinor.108
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Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
All five NOCs face the energy transition by situating their competitive advantage and striving to build on it to become competitive during the energy transition While some are already
becoming strong leaders in renewable energies, others are
slowly building capabilities in renewable energies and in the
meanwhile are focusing on improving the carbon efficiency of
their operations.
Equinor is building on its expertise in offshore platforms to
become a market leader in offshore wind. To this end, it has
set aggressive short- and medium-term targets to add 4 to
6 GW by 2026 (10 times higher than today’s capacity) and
12 to 16 GW by 2035. Over the past years some transformational projects include Dogger Bank (United Kingdom) and
Empire Wind (United States). Dogger Bank is expected to be
the world’s largest offshore wind farm with a total installed
capacity of 3.6 GW. Empire Wind, with a capacity of 816 MW,
will provide wind electricity to one million homes in New York
City. Equinor is also pioneering with Hywind Tampen, which
will feature the world’s first offshore oil fields to be powered
by floating offshore wind.81
Equinor’s diversification strategy has also aimed at solar projects, although solar is not the company’s competitive advantage. Equinor has a minority stake in Scatec Solar and is present in two solar projects in South America (in Argentina and
Brazil) but is hoping to grow in the market.82
Petronas seeks to increase renewable energy capacity to
3,000 MW by 2024, leveraging capabilities it has been developing since 2012. For instance, in 2012 it developed its first solar
project by commissioning a 685-kW solar PV system on the
rooftop of the Suria KLCC shopping mall in Kuala Lumpur, satisfying 30% of the building’s electricity demand. Afterwards,
it developed a 10 MW solar plant in Gebeng, Pahang, and a
solar PV system in Arexons in Italy. In 2018 Petronas installed
solar PV panels at the Pengerang Integrated Complex in Johor with a capacity of 207 KW. It plans to implement the Solar
Installation and Application on Petronas Rooftops & Assets
Nationwide project (SINARAN), with a potential of 30 MWp on
rooftops of Petronas facilities.83
By 2030 Sonatrach aims to “develop production capacities of
electricity from renewable energy; master [PV] energy technology becoming more profitable and cheaper; and save
natural gas volumes consumed in electricity by production
units to direct them toward export.”84 The company is focusing on building a competitive advantage on solar. Currently, it
spends 2% of its total investments in solar; however, it targets
to have 80% of its own electricity needs satisfied by solar by
2030 and plans to expand its solar generation to 4 GW by 2030,
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contributing to the Algerian government’s goal to have 22 GW
of solar capacity by 2030.85
Already in 2002 Sonatrach, Sonelgaz, and the private group
SIM created the New Energy Algeria (NEAL), a company with
the mission of developing and promoting renewable energy
in Algeria. In 2006, NEAL, in partnership with Abener Energia
and Holding SVH, set up Solar Power Plant One to operate the
power plant Hassi R’mel, generating 25 MW of solar power out
of 150 MW generated by thermal energy. In November 2018
Sonatrach partnered with Eni to commission a solar power
plant that will partly power the needs of the oil field of Bir Rebba Nord, saving 6 million of m3 of gas per year. 86
While Equinor, Petronas, and Sonatrach are already investing in renewable energies and plan to be market leaders in
that sector on the domestic market as well as internationally,
Petrobras and Saudi Aramco are focusing their efforts on improving the carbon efficiency of their operations, while slowly
building capabilities in renewable energies.
Petrobras’s Business and Management Plan 2019–2023 anticipates investments of USD 400 million in renewable energy and
gas, while allocating USD 500 million to mitigation projects for
its thermal operations and having less than 1% of its energy
portfolio (measures in MW) invested in renewable energies.87
However, in 2019, Petrobras signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Equinor to develop offshore wind projects jointly in Brazil, supported by R&D.88
Saudi Aramco is specializing in CCUS to enhance oil recovery, using the latest technologies to make the solutions cost
effective. For instance, the Hawiyah Gas Plant captures 30
million standard cubic feet of CO2 every day, and the CO2 is
later piped to the Uthmaniyah oil field and injected into the
oil reservoir to enhance oil recovery. Saudi Aramco is also capturing and taking advantage of wasted energy. For instance,
it acquired Novomer’s Converge in 2016, a polypropylene
carbonate polyols product line, to convert waste CO2 into
high-value materials.89
Saudi Aramco is building its capability in renewable energies
by equipping its own facilities with solar: it installed Saudi
Arabia’s first wind turbine at the Turaif oil refinery plant. It has
a 100,000 m2 carpark solar panel system with a power generation capacity of 10.5 MW.90 It has also made an announcement,
prior to the public offering, to dedicate between USD 30 billion
to USD 50 billion of capital expenditure in renewable energies
by 2023–2025, making up 1.7% of the total investment that
Saudi Aramco plans to invest by 2025. 91
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3.3.2. Transforming the Market
NNPC
It remains unclear whether NNPC’s Automotive Biofuel program involves a close partnership with the automotive sector
and downstream markets.92
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
Equinor, Saudi Aramco, and to a lesser extent Petronas and Petrobras are pioneering and demonstrating
the viability of innovative technologies to transform the
downstream markets.
Equinor and Saudi Aramco have been working with the industries combusting the fuel to reduce their footprint through
CCUS solutions. For instance, Equinor has partnered with
Shell, Total, and the Norwegian government in the Northern
Lights project, which involves the pipeline transport and permanent storage of CO2 from various third-party onshore industries (such as cement and waste to energy) in a reservoir in the
North Sea. Northern Lights is expected to have an initial annual storage capacity of 1.5 million tones CO2. This project follows the Norwegian government’s ambition to develop a fullscale CCUS value chain in Norway by 2024.93 Saudi Aramco is
looking to transform the transportation market by using Mobile Carbon Capture (MCC) technology, which “enable[s] the
unloading of CO2 at fuel stations for sequestration or recycling
into other forms of material or energy.” It can capture up to
25% of the CO2 emitted from a vehicle’s exhaust and store it
on board the vehicle until offloading. The technology is piloted with Volvo trucks and is targeting 50% of CO2 emissions
reduction, with 10% coming from improved engine and fuel
technology (see below) and 40% from the MCC.94
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras and Petronas have worked
with industrial partners on other solutions as well. Saudi Aramco is working with two carmakers and technology institutes on developing fuel-efficient engines using the gasoline
compression ignition (GCI) engine and opposed piston engine
technologies. The GCI technology is expected to be market
ready by 2021.95 Similarly Petronas is working with Daimler
Automotive on low-carbon fuel and carbon efficient engines
through the use of a cooling lubricant technology.96
While Petrobras is developing biofuels as jet fuels through
their BioQav product (a jet fuel produced from various sources
of biomass to be mixed with conventional jet fuel),97 Equinor is
working on developing hydrogen solutions for hard-to-abate
sectors. Equinor is partnering with Vattenfall and Gasunie in
converting Vattenfall’s Magnum gas-fired power plant in the
Netherlands to run on hydrogen by 2023—the first project of
the kind in the world.98

Since 2012, Saudi Aramco leads a non-industrial energy initiative to mainstream energy efficiency among companies and
households—the Lead by Example program. The goal of the
initiative is to “demonstrate viable energy efficiency solutions
for other companies and communities to emulate and concentrates on six key focus areas: water heaters, lighting, vehicles, heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), home
ownership, and smart electricity meters.” Under this initiative, Saudi Aramco aims at reducing its own non-industrial
energy consumption by 2020 by 35% versus a 2013 baseline.
As of 2019, it had achieved 90% progress toward this goal.99
3.3.3. Supporting Innovation in the Market
NNPC
NNPC does not report any research-related activity.
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
Looking forward and keeping up with the challenges of the
energy transition, the five NOCs analyzed have increased their
R&D investments, partnered with research institutions or invested in venture capital structures.
Equinor expects to increase its investments in low-carbon
solutions, renewables, and energy efficiency from 20% to 25%
of R&D funds by the end of 2020. In 2019 more than 65% of
these funds went into CCUS and renewables.100 Petrobras’s
R&D investments focus on renewables and biofuels. Petronas invests R&D in CCUS and fuel efficiency.101 Saudi Aramco
is partnering with academic and research partners experts
in sustainable energy, among them are the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), Stanford University, Imperial
College, Tsinghua University, the Korean Advanced Institute
of Science and Technology, and French Institute of Petroleum
(IFPen).102 Sonatrach partnered with Eni to collaborate in research for renewable energy, and petrophysics, with the Korean Institute of Industry for environmental technology and
with ENGIE for solar applications.
Equinor is investing USD 200 million in small and medium enterprises through venture capital funding to support the development of new technologies in both renewables and carbon-efficient oil and gas. Recent projects include the waste
heat to power technology that has the potential to reduce the
CO2 emissions from offshore gas turbines by 15–25%.103 Saudi
Aramco’s corporate venture capital will invest USD 500 million in renewable energy solutions and energy efficiency for
oil and gas. As part of Saudi Aramco’s strategic investments,
it signed an MOU with the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
(ADNOC) and Masdar, an Abu Dhabi-based renewable energy
and sustainable urban development company, to deliver improved performance and efficiency in the oil and gas value
chain, clean electricity generation, and carbon capture.104
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4. Analysis of Governance Aspects
of the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation
To play an effective role in the energy transition, NOCs need
to be financially robust and operationally sound. Adhering to
principles of good governance is a prerequisite to commercial
and operational success. For this reason, we present in this
section a comparative analysis of certain governance aspects
of NNPC109 as well as five other NOCs: Algeria’s Sonatrach, Brazil’s Petrobras, Malaysia’s Petronas, Norway’s Equinor, and
Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco.
Our analysis is guided by the principles set out in the Natural
Resource Charter Benchmarking Framework (Benchmarking
Framework), a tool for benchmarking various aspects of a
country’s performance on managing its extractives resources
against global best practices.110 The analysis focuses on Precept 6 of Benchmarking Framework; by examining the mandates, missions, and governance and operating models of the
NOCs, we aim to draw lessons that could be applied to improve the governance of NNPC.

4.1.

SOE role and funding. Does the government
clearly define the SOE’s role and establish
a working funding mechanism for the
company? (Precept 6.1)

4.1.1.

Commercial role. Does the government clearly
define a commercial role for the SOE that reflects the
company’s actual financial and technical capacity?
(Precept 6.1.1)

NNPC
NNPC is a vertically integrated wholly state-owned enterprise
through which the Federal Republic of Nigeria participates in
the oil and gas industry. NNPC has few limits on the commercial activities it is authorized to engage in. The NNPC Act 1977
describes the entity as being empowered to take part in “all”
commercial activities that relate to the petroleum sector.111
NNPC has exercised its commercial mandate in accordance
with various objectives over time, including: to participate as
an operator, to invest in order to increase reserves, to increase

Figure 9: NNPC
Group Financial
Performance (YTD
October 2019)
Source: NNPC
Monthly Financial
and Operations
Report October
2019.
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oil and gas production in the country, and to maximize Nigerian employment and local service company content. However, it is not clear that other important objectives have been
or are being considered, including those designed to maximize the rate of return to NNPC’s investments, to maximize
or smooth government revenues, to reduce imports of refined
products, to minimize safety and environmental risks, protect
community and consumer safety, and reduce pollution and
carbon emissions.112
NNPC’s broad discretion to determine the contours of its commercial mandate has led to the creation of 17 wholly-owned
subsidiaries, 16 partially-owned subsidiaries or associated
companies, and 7 corporate service units that engage in activities that span the oil and gas value chain, including exploration and production, gas development, refineries, petroleum
products and gas transportation, and distribution to retail.113
Beyond the oil and gas value chain, NNPC has subsidiaries
that focus on renewable energy, healthcare provision, real estate investment, among others.114
NNPC’s subsidiaries vary in their performance. The Nigerian
Petroleum Development Company, which drives NNPC’s core
business of exploration and production, is considered one
of the most profitable areas of the business,115 while downstream, NNPC’s refineries—Port Harcourt Refinery, Warri Refinery, and Kaduna Refinery—consistently underperform, face
high maintenance issues and operate at tremendous loss.116
Similarly, NNPC’s Crude Oil Marketing Division, which is in
charge of crude oil sales, is beset with governance challenges
that undermine the government’s ability to maximize revenue
from oil sales (Figure 9).117 The variable performance of NNPC’s
subsidiaries may be reflective of each subsidiaries’ financial
and technical capacity to carry out its assigned activities.118
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach

1980, after a process of increasing participation acquisitions
by the Saudi government.120 It operates as a joint-stock company since 2018,121 when the government offered 1.5% of the
company’s share capital for sale in the public market.122 Saudi
Aramco is the world’s largest integrated oil and gas company123 and the “most valuable publicly traded company in history.”124 Even though it is subject to a degree of political interference, it operates with substantial financial and operational
autonomy and “on an essentially technocratic basis with decisions being made on the basis of commercial, economic, and
technical criteria.”125
The Brazilian government created Petrobras in 1953 as a majority state-owned joint-stock company, granting it a national monopoly in the exploration, production, refining, and
transportation of petroleum.126 Private equity participation
was aimed at guaranteeing a certain level of capitalization.127
Petrobras was not created to be a source of fiscal resources
to the government or to make available politically oriented
services such as local employment.128 Initially operating the
importation of crude oil for local refining and distribution,129
Petrobras developed Brazil’s oil industry practically from
scratch.130 Since a 1995 constitutional amendment allowing
private participation in all levels of the oil industry,131 Petrobras is subject to domestic and foreign competition. Based on
a core strategic decision, the company has developed a longterm comparative advantage in deep-water exploration, becoming a world leader in the segment.132
In 1963, the Algerian government created Sonatrach as a stateowned commercial company responsible for the transportation and marketing of hydrocarbons, extending its mandate
in 1966 to the exploration, production, and transformation
of oil products. Sonatrach’s exploration and development efforts have made it a global leader in oil and gas exploration;
through joint ventures and other strategies, it has diversified
and expanded internationally.133

In the international NOCs analyzed as follows, there is a degree of political control as well as non-commercial roles.
Even so, all five governments are at least formally committed
to the policy that the NOCs are to be run as enterprises with
profit-seeking objectives and to be provided with substantial
administrative, commercial, technical, and operational decision-making autonomy. All five NOCs are vertically integrated,
engage in activities associated with international oil companies, lead the oil and gas sector in their respective domestic
markets, and some of them (namely, Equinor, Petrobras, and
Petronas) operate in a number of countries other than their
respective home states, resembling private international
oil companies.119

Norway created Statoil (currently Equinor) in 1972 with 100%
state ownership. Since its inception, the Norwegian government’s plan was for Equinor to be autonomous in business
matters,134 as a cost-effective and commercially operated
entity.135 Its partial privatization in 2001, permitting the sale
of shares totaling up to one-third of the company’s value,136
was intended to give the company added flexibility and to
strengthen its ability to compete internationally.137 Equinor is
currently a public limited company 67% owned by the state.
Its relationship with the state is conducted at arm’s length. It
was neither granted a monopoly nor burdened with excessive
fiscal or non-core non-commercial obligations.

Originally established in 1936 as a private company, Saudi
Aramco became a NOC wholly owned by the government in

Malaysia established Petronas in 1974 as a public limited corporation with commercial objectives, and ownership of and
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exclusive rights over Malaysia’s hydrocarbon resources. There
is no indication that it receives differential tax treatment compared to private oil companies. Petronas is a business with
profit as a prime objective.138 It has taken a strategic decision
to expand abroad, especially to markets perceived by other
companies as risky.
4.1.2.

Non-commercial roles. Does the government clearly
define the company’s non-commercial roles?
Does this definition limit conflicts of interest?
(Precept 6.1.2)

NNPC
NNPC engages in commercial, regulatory, and policy functions, without clearly delineating between commercial and
non-commercial roles.139 Its multiple roles creates significant
conflicts of interest, and researchers report that this results in
NNPC operating “as though it is above being regulated.”140 The
Department of Petroleum Resources has relied on NNPC’s superior technical capacity to inform policy and regulatory decisions, which facilitates NNPC’s significant influence over policy making.141 In addition, NNPC engages in a quasi-fiscal role.
For example, a 2014 audit of NNPC’s oil sales revealed quasi-fiscal expenditure including loans to foreign governments,
payments for a presidential helicopter, and payments for
World Cup–related travel.142 Moreover, NNPC has been tasked
with the non-commercial role of promoting local content in
the oil sector. This has resulted in NNPC using its position in JV
joint management meetings to influence budgeting decisions
to award contracts to Nigerian sub-contractors.143
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
While commercially oriented, all five NOCs analyzed also perform or have historically performed non-commercial roles.
Among these, regulatory roles include licensing, setting performance standards, ensuring legal compliance of other companies, and approving their exploration and production decisions. Quasi-fiscal roles performed by NOC include servicing
national debt, providing infrastructure and public services
such as health and education, and granting fuel subsidies.144
Non-commercial roles may not always be clearly articulated, in cases such as those of Saudi Aramco, Petronas, and
Sonatrach. Even so, to the extent they were mandated with
non-commercial roles, the reviewed NOCs have leveraged
these national policy objectives to develop international
comparative advantages (for example: expertise in deep-water fields for Petrobras). Following international best practices, all reviewed NOCs but Petronas have transitioned out of
the regulatory roles given to them historically. They have also
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generally succeeded in operating independently from government interference, although recent conflict of interest and
corruption cases in which Petrobras was implicated cannot be
ignored.
Although Equinor has been a commercially-driven enterprise
from its inception, between 1972 and 1981 it assumed functions of managing the state’s equity interest in oil and gas licenses and pipelines and serving as a conduit for economic
development, including through technology transfer145 and
local content requirements.146 This non-commercial role was
phased out in 1985, with the creation of a separate entity—
Statens Direkte Økonomiske Engagement (State’s Direct Financial Interest [SDFI])—to acquire most of the Norwegian
state’s interest in production licenses.147 Norway removed this
role from Equinor and partially privatized it in 2001 to give the
company greater flexibility and ability to compete internationally.148 The relationship between Equinor and the government is a distant one between the company as a government
entity and revenue generator, and changing political goals.149
Equinor is said to be free from pressures faced by many other NOCs, both in terms of the non-commercial activities that
the company has to directly engage in and a continual adjustment of the company’s strategy to conform to shorter-term
domestic policy goals.150
Besides the objective to obtain commercial success, Saudi Aramco has also had the objective of supporting the Saudi national mission—including ensuring the survival of the Al Saud
ruling family, seeking economic prosperity for political stability, and providing financial levers to sustain the government’s
legitimacy. Saudi Aramco’s managers seek projects that can
achieve commercial success and generate social benefits, but
this approach has generated tension at times, when the Saudi
government sought to maximize social benefit at the expense
of commercial success.151
The Brazilian government originally tasked Petrobras with
the goal of achieving self-sufficiency in both oil production
and refining capacity.152 More recently, Brazil’s federal government sought greater security of supply and directed Petrobras
to explore in Brazil’s deep offshore Campos basin. Petrobras
has been commercially profitable and internationally competitive while also responding to the government’s national
security mandates. When Petrobras was partially privatized
in 1997, the government established the National Petroleum
Agency to take over many of the non-commercial regulatory
roles performed by the company.153 At the same time, Petrobras provides a cautionary lesson in government interference.
It was also put under pressure to spend in non-core areas
and subsidize fuels.154 The Operation Car Wash bribery scandals resulted in former Brazilian president Ignacio Lula Da
Silva being convicted and imprisoned for bribery schemes;
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Petrobras was implicated in these schemes and was fined by
U.S. authorities.155
Petronas is a business with profit as a prime objective and
has remained relatively independent of the government in its
day-to-day operations.156 However, the company has conducted non-commercial activities. It acts as an industry regulator
and is the exclusive owner and grantors of licenses to the private sector.157 It also has quasi-fiscal activities such as being a
private banker for the government by acquiring interests in a
shipping company and a national carmaker, or a property developer in building the Petronas Towers and the administrative capital of Putrajaya.158 It has often translated these policy
objectives into commercial opportunities. For example, when
Malaysia’s petroleum fields were maturing in the 1990s, the
government’s desire to guarantee security of supply resulted
in Petronas expanding overseas.159
Sonatrach’s responsibilities grew in the 1960s and 1970s, as Algeria’s oil assets abroad were nationalized, and the company
operated as the instrument of the Algerian state’s monopoly of
gas and transport of hydrocarbons. However, the company’s
direct control of these assets was reduced in the 1980s, being
spun off to subsidiaries. In 2005, new legislation liberalized
the oil and gas sector, revoking Sonatrach’s monopoly over
upstream activities (even though a minimum participation of
Sonatrach at 51% is still required), and creating independent
regulatory bodies—the National Agency for the Valorization
of Hydrocarbon Resources (ALNAFT) and the Hydrocarbons
Regulatory Authority (ARH). These two bodies took over Sonatrach’s regulatory and licensing roles, and Sonatrach maintains its status as an operator only. Foreign partners in pro-

duction contracts with Sonatrach no longer collect their taxes
with Sonatrach as an intermediate, now paying them directly
to ALNAFT.160 However, the company contributes to Algeria’s
low RGI score in reporting on non-commercial activities,161
and allegations of corruption have damaged the company in
recent years.162
4.1.3.

Funding mechanism. Does the government ensure
that the SOE has a workable funding mechanism?
(Precept 6.1.3)

NNPC
The level of budget and financial autonomy is among the
indicators of workable funding mechanisms in NOCs. Based
on these factors, NNPC is not considered to have a workable
funding mechanism that allows predictable and sufficient
revenue flows to fund its operations, though there have been
improvements in recent years.163
In terms of budget autonomy, the board of directors’ decision-making powers are subject to presidential/cabinet
approval, and the board has limited and circumscribed decision-making power on financial matters.164 Indeed, NNPC
is amongst the group of NOCs that transfer the most to the
government, with low retention of revenues. Based on publicly available data for 2011–2014, NNPC transferred an average of USD 50 per barrel to the government.165 However, due
to unclear accounting of revenues and the network of NNPC
subsidiaries with some of them sitting offshore, the accurate
amount of NNPC’s accumulated revenues remains unknown
to the public. In addition, there are no clear rules of transfer

Table 1: NOCs, Achievement of Goals, and Regulatory and Fiscal Roles
Company achievement of
government technical and
economic goals

High

Medium
Low

Company

Company plays
regulatory role
(as of today)?

Company plays
quasi-fiscal role
(as of today)?

Equinor

No

No

Saudi Aramco

No

Yes

Petrobras

No

Yes

Petronas
Sonatrach
NNPC

Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Source: Prepared by the authors based on NRGI.269
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of revenues to the government as a legal conflict remains between section 162 of Nigeria’s Federal Constitution of 1999,
on the one hand, which requires all government-collected
revenues to enter the Federation Account, and section 7 of the
NNPC Act of 1977 on the other, which allows the corporation
to maintain a “fund” to finance its activities, without further
specification.166 As such, NNPC has interpreted this rule over
the years with little effect in improving its ability to perform.
For example, once clear source of revenue waste and inefficiency is the Domestic Crude Allocation (DCA). Every day, the
Nigerian government allocates 445,000 barrels to NNPC for
sales to the domestic refineries through its subsidiary, the
Pipelines and Product Marketing Company (PPMC). Because
the four Nigerian refineries can only process around 100,000
barrels per day, NNPC reroutes most of the DCA to the export
market or petroleum for product swaps. NNPC then exerts discretionary withholding on these export revenues to finance its
activities with the percentage being sent to the federal level
varying from year to year (for example, it was 73% in 2004 and
58% in 2012).167
NNPC has also consistently struggled to meet its JV cash call
obligations.168 Previously, the Nigerian government managed
funds relating to upstream joint venture petroleum operations and NNPC’s equity share of a JV and funded cash calls
by means of annual budget appropriation.169 The federal government no longer funds cash calls directly; instead, they are
now funded by aggregate revenues from NNPC’s “subsidiaries
and business units, deductions from oil revenue due to the
federation, and third-party financing for approved projects
to finance its operations.”170 This aggregation of revenues occurs in the absence of clear rules and outside of the formal
budgeting process.171
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
All five international NOCs play a sophisticated commercial
role with financing needs associated with large-scale investment. Appropriately they all retain a moderate to high level
of autonomy on revenues to finance their activities and have
considerable autonomy and decision-making power on financial, budgetary, and investment matters while being submitted to strong oversight and reporting mechanisms (see
Precepts 6.2.2 and 6.3). Most of the NOCs (Petrobras, Petronas, Equinor, and Saudi Aramco) are listed on stock exchanges,172 and some (Petrobras, Petronas, and Equinor) can issue
bonds in the international financial market to finance their
capital expenditures.173
Equinor has a general policy to keep a liquidity reserve, as well
as committed, unused credit to ensure that it has sufficient
financial resources to meet short-term requirements.174 It finances its capital expenditures both internally and external-
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ly.175 The long-term funding of Equinor is raised when a need is
ascertained for such financing based on its business activities,
cash flows, and required financial flexibility or when market
conditions are considered to be favorable.176
Petrobras is allowed to retain much of the oil revenue177 and
has a degree of financial autonomy,178 although it is required
to submit its proposed annual budget to the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Mines and Energy for review,179 and
to the Brazilian Congress for approval. The Brazilian government controls Petrobras’s budget and establishes limits on its
investments and long-term debt.180 Petrobras is required to
maintain a legal reserve, to which it must allocate 5% of net
income for each fiscal year until the amount for such reserve
equals 20% of its paid-in capital.181
Petronas retains profits on earnings, paying royalties and taxes like international companies;182 it also pays high dividends
to the State and does not obtain funds from the national treasury.183 Some have criticized this revenue retention model as
being too onerous on Petronas, with the dividend payout ratio sometimes reaching 74% in addition to other taxes.184 Its
board of directors decides upon bond sales, and there are no
official restrictions on borrowing.185
Saudi Aramco has an all-inclusive and disciplined internal
approval process for capital expenditures, new projects, and
debt incurrence.186 It controls its own operating revenue,187
which is the primary source of funding for its activities,188 and
evaluates future projects based on strategic, operational,
commercial and financial targets. The company’s unique reserves and resources base, operational flexibility, field management, and strong cash-flow generation serve as a foundation for its low gearing and flexibility to allocate capital.189 The
board of directors obtains loans, issues bonds, and enter into
other financing instruments on behalf of the company.190 Accordingly, Saudi Aramco enjoys comfortable financial operating conditions,191 even if the Saudi Government relies on Saudi
Aramco for a significant portion of its revenue.192
Sonatrach is, among the five analyzed, the NOC that retains
the least of its revenues to finance its activities, transferring
roughly 60% of its revenues to the government.193 It relies
heavily on international partners for funding and expertise to
conduct its operations, and in recent years it is facing difficulties to attract foreign investors given low oil and gas prices,
political protests and security risks in Algeria, and increased
competition. A 2019 amendment to the hydrocarbon law aims
at restoring the attractiveness of the country’s oil sector to
foreign investment by improving contract terms and reducing
the tax burden on Sonatrach and its international partners
from 85% to 60%–65%.194
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4.2.

4.2.1.

SOE corporate governance. Do the SOE’s
corporate governance systems limit
political interference in the company’s
technical decisions, while ensuring effective
oversight? (Precept 6.2)
Role of state shareholders. Does the government
clearly establish the identity and role of state
shareholders in the SOE? (Precept 6.2.1)

NNPC
NNPC is a wholly owned state enterprise, and the President
of Nigeria exercises decision-making power, with few checks
and balances to temper political interference in NNPC’s operations.195 For example, NNPC is granted limited powers to contract and spend, a role typically exercised through operational
units.196 Approving power in these matters is concentrated in
the president.197 In general, there are reportedly high levels
of political interference in NNPC’s operations, including in
the discretionary allocation of licensees, crude oil lifting contracts, fuel importation contracts, and in the appointment of
senior employees.198
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
All five international NOCs analyzed provide clarity on the
identity and role of state shareholders. In some of them—notably Equinor but also Petrobras, Petronas, and Saudi Aramco
to a large extent—corporate governance systems are in place
that limit political interference in the company and ensure
effective oversight. In turn, Sonatrach operates with a lower
degree of independence from the government.
Petrobras’s bylaws provide that it is a mixed-capital company
controlled by Brazil’s Federal Government, for an indefinite
term.199 The bylaws indicate that the government may guide
the activities of Petrobras “to contribute to the public interest that justified its creation, aiming at meeting the objective
of the national energy policy,”200 as long as certain conditions
are met: policy objectives are required by law or regulation
and provided for in a contractual arrangement; costs and
revenues of investment projects to achieve such objectives
are broken down and disclosed; and the obligations and responsibilities assumed by the company abide by specified
market conditions.201

State ownership interest in Equinor. The MPE will customarily
decide how the Norwegian State will vote on proposals submitted to general meetings of the shareholders.202
Since Saudi Aramco became an NOC, successive Saudi kings
and governments have protected its commercial culture and
shielded its day-to-day operations from undue political interference. Even if ultimate control of the company lies with the
ruling family, a sophisticated system of public administration
has delegated authority in practice. The Supreme Council on
Petroleum and Mineral Affairs (SCPMA)—composed of the
king, the crown prince, eight ministers, and the CEO of Saudi
Aramco—formally regulates the oil sector and oversees Saudi
Aramco’s activities. In practice, SCPMA’s supervisory role has
been minimal, simply endorsing the decisions made by Saudi
Aramco’s board of directors and trusting that the company’s
strategy will align with the country’s goals. 203
The Prime Minister’s office is the sole shareholder in Petronas
and collects annual dividends and taxes from the company.204
Although the management of Petronas has a close relationship the Malaysian government, particularly the Prime Minister’s Office, Prime Ministers have usually been careful not to
appear to be too deeply involved in day-to-day activities of
the company. In part, there is recognition that the appearance
of an overly interfering government would have a negative effect on world markets. At the same time, it is to be expected
that when the national interest is paramount or there is need
to tap into the financial resources of Petronas, there will be
state involvement.205
Sonatrach is formally a joint-stock company but in practice a
public company wholly owned and tightly controlled by the
Algerian government.206 While striving to ensure that Sonatrach performed efficiently, the Algerian government has
maintained financial, administrative, and legal control and
influence over the company’s revenues and operations, often
undercutting its performance.207 Since the restructuring of the
company in 1998, its General Assembly—chaired by the Ministry of Energy and Mines—reports to the National Energy Council (NEC), which oversees the country’s energy policy agenda
and holds operational and legal control over Sonatrach, even
if not involved in its daily operations. The NEC is headed by
the Algerian president and includes as members the central
bank governor, a representative of the Presidency, and three
leading ministers.208

As regards Equinor, the Norwegian State’s ownership policy
is that the principles in the Norwegian Code of Practice for
Corporate Governance will apply to State ownership. The Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) manages the

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 23

Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition

4.2.2.

Board models. Does the SOE have an empowered,
professional and independent board? (Precept 6.2.2)

NNPC
The NNPC Act stipulates that NNPC’s board consists of a chairperson, the Director-General of the Federal Ministry of Finance
and Economic Development, the managing director of NNPC,
and three people appointed by the National Council of Ministers based on their ability, experience or specialized knowledge of the oil industry or of business or professional attainments and can make useful contributions to the work of NNPC.209The majority of NNPC’s directors are not independent of
the government. The Minister of Petroleum Resources, a role
currently held by the President, is specified by the Act as the
chairperson of the board,210 and the board operates mainly at
direction of the President.
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
All international NOCs analyzed are professionally run by
technically competent management, following corporate
governance structures and practices comparable to the OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance.211 However, in Sonatrach,
Petrobras, Petronas, and Saudi Aramco, there are government
representatives in the boards of directors, the CEO is appointed by the government, and a board member may also be CEO.
The involvement of government officials weakens the independence of the NOCs’ boards of directors, which should be
composed of members selected based on their technical expertise rather than political considerations.212
The work of the governing bodies in Equinor is based on a
well-defined separation of roles and responsibilities between
the shareholders, the Board of Directors and the Management.213 The Board of Equinor is independent of the Management of the Company.214 The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
Equinor is appointed by the Board who also stipulates his/
her salary.215 The board of directors consists of nine to eleven
members. The corporate assembly are required to elect Board
of directors, including the chair and the deputy chair for up to
two years.216 The State has no appointed board members or
members of the Corporate Assembly in Equinor.217 The Norwegian Company Law stipulates that the company’s employees
are represented by three Board members. The Members of the
Board elected by the employees have three deputy members
who attend board meetings in the event an employee-elected member of the board is unable to attend. The other Board
members elected by other shareholders do not have deputy
members. The management is not represented on the Board
of Directors.218
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As regards Saudi Aramco, the Saudi Kingdom is required to directly nominate six candidates for election to the membership
of the board of directors, while the other five directors ought
to be independent as mandated by the law and regulations
of the Kingdom.219 The State, like all other holders of ordinary
shares, has the right to vote at the Ordinary General Assembly for the election of all board members other than the President and CEO of the Company. Similarly, the voting right of
the State at the Ordinary General Assembly on the dismissal of
the members of the Board can apply to independent directors
and members who have not been nominated by it.220
Petrobras’s Board of Directors consists of a minimum of seven
and a maximum of eleven members, elected at the General
Shareholders Meeting for a term of up to two years, with the
possibility of a maximum of three consecutive re-elections.221
As the holder of least 50% plus one share of the voting capital
of the company,222 Brazil’s Federal Government has the power
to elect a majority of the board members.223 In addition, the
Ministry of Economy has the right to indicate one of them.224
The Board of Directors must be composed of at least 40% of
independent members.225 The Executive Office includes one
Chairperson, chosen by the Board of Directors from among its
members, and up to eight Executive Officers, elected by the
Board of Directors, among natural persons residing in the Brazil, for a term of up to two years, with the possibility of a maximum of three consecutive re-elections; they can be dismissed
at any time.226
Until 2009, the board of directors of Petronas was composed of
the Director General of the Economic Planning Unit, the General Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, the Director of the
Economic and Coordination Unit, and the independent advocate and solicitor. However, since 2010, the Non-Executive
Directors are now appointed and re-appointed by the Annual
General Meeting. All the Non-Executive Directors are considered by the Board to be wholly independent. The Malaysian
Prime Minister appoints the chairperson of the board.227 Petronas has a Board Selection Criteria and Guiding Principles for
the Appointment/Re-appointment of Directors so as to ensure
that the Board is refreshed timely and with the right composition. It also has an Independent Directors’ Guidelines (Guidelines) whereby the Independent Directors’ Review is part of
an annual exercise. The Guidelines regulate amongst others,
the tenure of Independent Non-Executive Directors and the
criteria for Independent Directors. The positions and roles of
Chairperson of the board and CEO are held by two different
individuals in order to promote greater accountability.228
In Sonatrach, several individuals from various Algerian ministries—two from the. Ministry of Energy, two from the Ministry
of Finance, and one from the Algerian Central Bank—serve as
members of the board of directors, along with several of the
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company’s senior managers and its CEO, who serves at the
same time as chair of the board of directors.229 In turn, the Executive Committee consists of the chair and CEO as well as
other senior managers of the company, including vice-presidents and executive directors.230 As chair of Sonatrach’s General Assembly, the Ministry of Energy and Mines nominates the
company’s chair and CEO and approves its Executive Committee. Ultimately, the Algerian president has the final say in the
appointment of managers, vice-presidents, and other personnel.231
4.2.3.

Staff integrity. Does the SOE invest in staff integrity
and capacity? (Precept 6.2.3)

NNPC
The Talent Management Department in Abuja manages staff
training for all the strategic business units and corporate
services units. NNPC has a Training Academy in Kaduna.
NNPC also has a secondment arrangement for on-the-jobtraining with joint venture operators, contractors and other
partners both locally and overseas. The 2019 Benchmarking
Report notes:232
The NNPC has one of the more robust remunerations
and professional development structures among Nigerian public service organizations. The NNPC’s Leadership
Academy was established to provide technical, managerial and executive training within and outside the corporation.
However, a survey of NNPC staff reveal difficulties in translating training into practical technical capacity and integrity
performance. Olive Egbuta in her study on “Leadership Succession Practices and Employees’ Career Development in The
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation” surveyed a sample
of NNPC employees and recorded the following opinions:233
There is a constant leadership changes and the way it is
done makes the rest of the employees feel insecure and
believe the same faith may befall them. Government interference in NNPC is huge. The government decides who
comes in and who goes out leading to staff diminishing
commitment to the organization. [The Group Managing
Director role] is no longer considered as career based but
highly political, therefore it is no longer news to hear of
sacking but routine.

Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
The five international NOCs analyzed operate with clear rules
and institutional frameworks for staff development and integrity. In Petronas, Equinor, and Saudi Aramco, CEOs are typically promoted from within the companies, rewarding professional growth and fostering capacity building, stability, and
longer-term thinking. In all NOCs, there are mechanisms for
career development for staff, institutionalized integrity training and compliance frameworks, clearly defined recruitment
processes, and plans for leadership and succession.
Saudi Aramco makes significant contributions to the development of human capital, with estimated expenditures of
around USD 500 million per year on human resources. For
example, first-year employees attend the company’s Industrial Training Center in Dharan, and the most promising ones
are awarded full scholarships for overseas training.235 Petrobras maintains programs that provide ethical, technical, and
leadership training to its employees.236 In addition, it strives
to continually improve its corporate governance and compliance practices, based on codes of conduct and good practice
as well as channels for employees and other stakeholders to
report potential breaches.237
Equinor’s code of conduct regulates the company’s practices toward its employees (including with respect to diversity
and privacy), operations (including guidance on avoiding
corruption and conflicts of interests), business partners, the
environment, and stakeholders such as governments and local communities.238 In Petronas, executives must comply with
good governance best practices and training requirements set
out in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance.239 The
company has also instituted a Code of Conduct and Business
Ethics Guide, with guidance on conflicts of interest, fighting
corruption, financial integrity, workplace culture, among others.240 Sonatrach’s code of conduct of 2010 outlines the company’s values; sets out its commitments to employees, commercial partners, and the environment. The code includes
ethics norms applicable to all employees, subject to enforcement by an ethics committee.241

The study also found that over two thirds of survey respondents do not believe that NNPC has an established career
path for employees and professional groups, or that training
and development opportunities are explicitly linked to the
strategic direction of NNPC.234

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 25

Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition

4.3.

SOE transparency and accountability.
Are SOE decision-making and operations
transparent and accountable? (Precept 6.3)

4.3.1.

SOE operational and payment data. Does the SOE
disclose key operational and payment data?
(Precept 6.3.1)

NNPC
According to the Resource Governance Index and EITI, the
government publicly discloses how much revenue it receives
from NNPC, and NNPC publicly discloses how much revenue it
transfers to the government.242 Information on NNPC’s aggregate production volume is also publicly available, as is information on its aggregate sales volume.243 But NNPC does not
publicly disclose the amount spent on non-commercial activities, disaggregated information on the sale of production
by NNPC and subsidiaries (for example, beneficial ownership
on off-takers, beneficial owners operating in commodity trading),244 or the cost of its operations.245 NNPC does not disclose
detailed annual reports either. However, for the first time, in
2020, NNPC disclosed the audited statement of its accounts
and that of its subsidiaries, disclosing the state of profitability
of profit and loss of the entire group.246 Time will tell if this becomes a normal and regular occurrence.
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
The NOCs analyzed disclose key operational and payment
data, including, in some cases details about their subsidiaries
to varying degrees. The extent to which the companies are listed on a stock exchange with strong disclosure requirements
or belonging to countries member to the EITI influences the
extent of the disclosure.
Petrobras and Equinor, being listed on stock exchanges with
rigorous corporate reporting requirements (New York, Oslo,
and Sao Paulo), offer an important amount of key operational
data. Similarly, Petronas has become more transparent over
time thanks to its bond issuance247 while some of its subsidiaries have been listed on the Kuala Lumpur stock exchange
since the mid-1990s.248 For years, Saudi Aramco has been
opaque, but in April 2019 as part of the initial public offering
(IPO) effort, disclosed a significant amount of key operational
data and transfers to the government.249 Sonatrach, however,
is not listed on any stock exchange, and has ranks the lowest
of the five NOCs analyzed in the Resource Governance Index;
however, it still ranks higher than NNPC.250 Post-IPO disclosures for Saudi Aramco remain to be seen as a result of its listing on the Saudi stock exchange.
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Belonging to the only country being subject to European
transparency directive251 and EITI compliant member, Equinor
is tremendously more transparent than the other NOCs. Its
disclosures detail its payments by projects in jurisdiction,
the financial relationship between government and state
enterprises, production volumes disaggregated by field,
revenues from oil sales and how the oil is marketed on an
aggregate basis.252
Irrespective of the reporting requirements to which companies are subject, they all remain not transparent enough on
commodity trading. In addition, Sonatrach and Petrobras remain unclear on their transfers to the government, and all of
the NOCs playing a non-commercial role remain unclear on
such activities.253
4.3.2.

SOE financial reporting and audits. Does the SOE
subject itself to independent financial audits, and
publish the results? (Precept 6.3.2)

NNPC
The NNPC Act requires NNPC’s annual financial statements
to be audited by an independent auditor, however NNPC has
not regularly published the audited reports.254 NNPC has publicly disclosed unaudited operational and financial data on
a monthly basis,255 and for the first time, in 2020, NNPC published the audited statement of its accounts included disaggregated by subsidiaries.256
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
Of the four NOCs, the two privatized or partially privatized
ones—Petrobras and Equinor—subject themselves to independent financial audits and publish the results of those audits, as required by the stock exchanges where they are listed.
Petronas does not follow this practice for the parent company
of the group, but its publicly listed subsidiaries do. Petronas
and Saudi Aramco, which remain largely government owned,
prepare and publish financial statements according to international financial reporting standards, but without engaging
independent external auditors to prepare them. Petronas is
only subjected to state auditors.257 As a result of its public offering, Saudi Aramco will need to conduct independent audits
and disclose reports to comply with stock exchange requirements. Sonatrach, however, subjects its financial reports to
internal audits only, publishing the auditors’ certification.258
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4.3.3.

SOE legislative oversight. Does the legislature
oversee SOE performance without unduly
constraining its decision making? (Precept 6.3.3)

NNPC
In exercising their role in legislating in the public interest, setting national priorities and strategies, and approving government budgets, parliamentarians need information on the impact of NOCs on revenues and can help oversee the operation
of these companies.259 NNPC is not required to submit annual
reports to the legislature on its annual activities.260 Legislative
oversight is reactive rather than proactive, often in response
to allegations of wrongdoing, and has not generally led to
accountability for wrongdoing or poor performance.261 More
recently, in the context of the current oil crisis, Nigeria’s high
cost of oil production and associated poor marginal profit has
alarmed its current legislators who have demanded increased
transparency around the cost structure. The Nigerian Senate
has challenged NNPC to be more transparent with federally
funded projects. 262
Saudi Aramco, Equinor, Petrobras, Petronas, and Sonatrach
All five international NOCs analyzed are subject to Parliament
oversight in some way. Petrobras is the most constrained and
submit its budget for legislative approval and been reporting
its performance to Brazil’s National Congress on a quarterly
basis since 2016.263 In turn, Sonatrach, Petronas, Equinor, and
Saudi Aramco are not required to seek government approval of their budgets. Petronas shares its budget with the legislature, whereas the others do not. Sonatrach only shares its
budget with the regulatory authority, ALNAFT.264
In all companies, in exceptional cases the legislature can intervene. For instance, the Norwegian State may be required to
seek approval from the Norwegian Parliament’s (the Storting)
before voting on certain proposals for Equinor: for instance,
projects with important economic and social externalities, or
costs exceeding USD 840 million265 or if Equinor issues additional shares and such issuance would significantly dilute the
Norwegian State’s holding, or if such issuance would require
a capital contribution from the Norwegian State in excess of
government mandates.266
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5. Recommendations
The persistent critical issues in NNPC’s governance have both
hampered oil sector development and deprived Nigeria from
public resources. The oil, climate, and COVID-19 crises and the
ramp-up of the low-carbon transition exacerbate this reality,
with the NOC providing sub-optimal returns to its stakeholders. It is therefore time for the Nigerian government and legislature to reconsider NNPC’s role in the context of the energy
transition and accordingly implement profound reform of the
company. While the government has been called upon many
times in the past to reform NNPC,267 the current crisis provides
a unique opportunity and political momentum to forge ahead
with much-needed reform to avoid long-term damage to the
country.
We encourage the Nigerian government to take the following
practical steps:
1. Hire experts to develop an energy transition plan
for Nigeria. The plan to be developed must assess how
to phase out the exploitation of oil and avoid the asset-stranding risk, developing a feasible and bankable
roadmap for the exploitation of associated gas during the
remaining exploitation of oil, and analyzing the type of renewable energy generation deployment that is necessary
to satisfy the country’s energy needs (utility scale, home
systems, mini grid, among others).
2. Run an institutional analysis of the role to be played
by each key public or private institution in the energy
transition. Defining what role NNPC could usefully play
in the energy transition means understanding the roles
of the other key actors as well, such as national power
utilities, the ministry of energy, private investors in power
generation, technology and research institutions, international donors, and international and national banks.
Responsibilities should be clearly allocated and institutions’ roles defined accordingly.
3. Fundamentally reform NNPC, or privatize. NNPC cannot play a useful role in the energy transition without
deep reform seeking, in particular, to make it independent from political interference at all operational and
management levels, reduce opportunities for corruption,
enshrine transparency and internal as well as external
oversight in NNPC’s governance framework, build capacity within the company to operate in the renewable energy sector, and legally clarify its funding mechanism and
revenue retention model. As is done in the utility sector,
the government could also sign a management contract
with clear performance indicators with NNPC. Public listing of the company on a stock exchange is an avenue to
consider. If such profound reform is not feasible for lack
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of political champions inside the government or within
NNPC, a better avenue would be to privatize NNPC or at
least some of its subsidiaries.
4. Include principles of climate change governance in the
NNPC reform agenda. Whether NNPC remains a public
entity or is privatized, the government should impose climate change governance principles as recommended by
TPI (see annex) on NNPC’s management (and any other
company operating in an emission-intensive industry).
5. Consider setting up a separate strategic division of
NNPC or in case of NNPC privatization, an independent
entity with clearly delineated objectives and responsibilities focused on the low-carbon energy transition.
a. Organizational and strategic objectives: Consider whether and how the division or entity should
focus on:
•
•
•
•
•

Reducing carbon emission from existing and future oil and gas projects;
Planning how to limit the number and type oil
and gas projects to facilitate the low-carbon
transition;
Developing new business in renewable energy;
Coordinating with private investors or with other
government agencies;
Ensuring alignment of activities with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and Nigeria’s climate commitments; among others.

To prevent vested interests from stalling progress,
the division or entity should be staffed with new hires
with relevant skills and experience, including, for example, entrepreneurship, small businesses, venture
capital, customer service and marketing, logistics,
environmental economics, change management,
project management, environmental science, information technology, among others.
b. Organizational processes: Aspects to be considered
include:
•

Establishing clear and relevant target metrics
and performance results that are closely tied
with the objectives of the entity and its role in the
energy transition. Results should be made publicly available, independently audited, and used
in evaluating effectiveness, such as:
o

Carbon intensity trajectory as compared to
Paris Agreement–aligned emissions pathways;
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o
o
o
o
o
o

Quantity of methane leaks and gas flaring
from oil and gas production;
Number of oil and gas fields with carbon
capture and storage;
Number and percentage of households with
home-based solar systems;
Percentage of overall power generation using renewables, natural gas, heat recovery
systems, and carbon capture;
Percentage of building consumption using
electricity, natural gas, and heat recovery
systems;
Percentage of transportation consumption
using electricity, liquefied petroleum gas,
sustainable biofuels, and carbon capture.

•

Establishing a compliance timeline for existing
fields to stop gas flaring, control methane leaks,
eliminate the use of diesel to power operations
and facilities, make mandatory the use associated gas or renewable energies, and establish carbon emission standards.

•

Assessing the stranded asset risk and on this basis, establishing strict criteria for approvals of
new oil and gas projects. These should include:
prohibiting gas flaring, withdrawing fiscal incentives, and ensuring methane leak controls
in place. New oil and gas projects should not increase Nigeria’s stranded asset risk.

•

Establishing an independent oversight agency
for contracting processes and awards, subjected
to public disclosure requirements.

c.

Funding: Funding sources for this new division or entity should be identified in advance and in ways that
incentivize desired results. The following options
could be considered:
•

 stablishing a formula for the specific source of
E
funding for this division or entity, for example,
from existing petroleum revenues, but with that
source declining over time in order to avoid incentivizing more oil production. Funding from
oil revenues would be replaced over time as the
new division or entity achieves its commercial
objectives and becomes self-sustaining.

•

Establishing joint ventures or funding mechanisms with Niger Delta Power Holding Company
(NDPHC), NNPC’s RED and Gas and Power divisions, the International Finance Corporation
(IFC), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the
European Union, USAID’s Power Africa and private investors (such as the renewable energy
divisions of the International Oil Companies) to
assist with new energy transition projects and to
assist smaller Nigerian oil companies with carbon emission compliance.
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6. Conclusion
In contrast to the governments of Algeria, Brazil, Malaysia,
Norway, and Saudi Arabia, the Nigerian government cannot
yet rely on NNPC to harness the energy transition. NNPC’s energy transition program is weak and lacks strategic and operational means.
Moreover, the government cannot rely on NNPC to be an oil
and gas market player for the remaining time before fossil fuels become stranded. Its cost of extraction is too high for today’s price levels, and its carbon intensity is higher than the
global average, which is problematic for the environment as
well as on a commercial basis as worldwide carbon pricing
initiatives proliferate.
It is therefore imperative for NNPC to seize the energy transition as a business opportunity to save itself as well as Nigeria
from its oil dependence. However, NNPC can only do so if it
embarks on a long overdue reform of its governance. The disclosure of NNPC’s audits that occurred in early 2020 for the
first time in its history is a promising sign that the company
may be turning a corner.
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The experience and governance systems of the five NOCs reviewed for this report should not be followed blindly,268 as
many of them should also considerably improve their governance and energy transition strategies. Even so, they remain
ahead of NNPC in both areas and as such can serve as benchmarks or, at the very least, sources of inspiration.
Moreover, the benchmarking framework developed by the
NRC for the governance of NOCs used in this report and that of
TPI to assess the quality of the climate and energy transition
governance and management (see Annex 1) are invaluable
tools to guide the reform of the NNPC. We hope that these
frameworks and the comparative experiences highlighted will
support reflection around much-needed NNPC reform.
As Nigerian policymakers focus on mitigating the fallout from
the painful recession triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic
reform of NNPC should fall near the very top of the agenda.
Such efforts will position NNPC to sustainably contribute to
Nigeria’s economy and energy independence in the long term.
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Annex: TPI Questionnaire
Level 0: Unaware of Climate Change as a Business Issue
1. Does the company acknowledge climate change as a significant issue for the business?
Level 1: Acknowledging Climate Change as a Business Issue
2. Does the company recognize climate change as a relevant risk and/or opportunity for the business?
3. Does the company have a policy (or equivalent) commitment to action on climate change?
Level 2: Building Capacity
4. Has the company set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets?
5. Has the company published information on its Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions?
Level 3: Integrating into Operational Decision Making
6. Has the company nominated a board member or board committee with explicit responsibility for oversight of the climate change
policy?
7. Has the company set quantitative targets for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions?
8. Does the company report on Scope 3 emissions?
9. Has the company had its operational (Scope 1 and/or 2) greenhouse gas emissions data verified?
10. Does the company support domestic and international efforts to mitigate climate change?
11. Does the company disclose its membership and involvement in trade associations engaged in climate issues?
12. Does the company have a process to manage climate-related risks?
13. Does the company disclose Scope 3 use of product emissions?
Level 4: Strategic Assessment
14. Has the company set long-term quantitative targets for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions?
15. Does the company’s remuneration for senior executives incorporate climate change performance?
16. Does the company incorporate climate change risks and opportunities in their strategy?
17. Does the company undertake climate scenario planning?
18. Does the company disclose an internal price of carbon?
19. Does the company ensure consistency between its climate change policy and the positions taken by trade associations of which
it is a member?

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 31

Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition

Endnotes
1
2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Lisa Sachs, Nicolas Maennling, and Perrine Toledano, “How Oil and Gas Companies Can Help Meet the Global Goals on
Energy and Climate Change” (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, June 20, 2017), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/
files/2017/01/170620-Energy-and-Climate-Draft-Full-Master_v2.pdf.
“S&P 500® – S&P Dow Jones Indices,” accessed July 20, 2020, https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/equity/sp-500/#data.
“Oil demand is estimated to have dropped as a result of COVID-19 by 30% over the period March and April 2020. This drop
is the equivalent loss in world demand of 30 million barrels per day of crude oil.” Anees Azzouni, “The Impact of Oil Demand Collapse and Persistent Oversupply on the Oil and Gas Industry, Markets, and the Transition to a Low Carbon World
Regime” (Energy Consultant at Azzouni & Associates, Inc., May 21, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/impact-oil-demand-collapse-persistent-oversupply-gas-industry-anees.
Eklavya Gupte, “Nigeria’s President Confirms Removal of Gasoline Subsidies,” S&P Global Platts, June 5, 2020, https://
www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/060520-nigerias-president-confirms-removal-of-gasoline-subsidies.
350 Africa Org, “Nigeria, Renewable Energy in Africa: An Opportunity in a Time of Crisis,” n.d., https://7lo0w1yurlr3bozjw1hac3st-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/files/2020/07/Nigeria.pdf.
“Renewable Energy,” Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, accessed June 25, 2020, https://www.nnpcgroup.com/
NNPC-Business/Midstream-Ventures/Pages/Renewable-Energy.aspx.
Justin Worland, “The Reason Fossil Fuel Companies Are Finally Reckoning with Climate Change,” Time, January 16, 2020,
https://time.com/5766188/shell-oil-companies-fossil-fuels-climate-change and Tom Sanzillo, “IEEFA Update: Oil and Gas
Stocks Place Dead Last in 2019, Again, despite 30% Price Rise,” Institute for Energy Economics & Financial Analysis (blog),
January 9, 2020, https://ieefa.org/ieefa-update-oil-and-gas-stocks-place-dead-last-in-2019-again-despite-30-price-rise.
“S&P 500® – S&P Dow Jones Indices.”
Kevin Crowley and Brandon Kochkodin, “Exxon Poised to Drop From S&P 500’s Top 10 for First Time Ever,” Bloomberg,
August 30, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-30/exxon-poised-to-drop-from-s-p-500-s-top-10for-first-time-ever.
Sheela Tobben, “Negative Oil Prices: What Does Oil Below Zero Really Mean?,” Bloomberg, April 20, 2020, https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-20/negative-prices-for-oil-here-s-what-that-means-quicktake.
Barbosa et al., “Oil and Gas after COVID-19.”
Barbosa et al., “Oil and Gas after COVID-19.”
Worland, “The Reason Fossil Fuel Companies Are Finally Reckoning with Climate Change.”
Patrick Heller, “Fiscal Futures: Are National Oil Companies Champions or Obstacles for Energy Transition?,” International Budget Partnership (blog), May 22, 2019, https://www.internationalbudget.org/2019/05/fiscal-futures-are-national-oil-companies-champions-or-obstacles-for-energy-transition.
“Energy – The Official Portal of the UAE Government,” United Arab Emirates Government, accessed June 11, 2020, https://u.
ae/en/information-and-services/environment-and-energy/water-and-energy/energy.
Ramanan Krishnamoorti, “What Does The Oil Price Crisis Mean For The Energy Transition?,” Forbes, March 13, 2020,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2020/03/13/what-does-the-oil-price-crisis-mean-for-the-energy-transition.
BloombergNEF, “New Energy Outlook 2019,” BloombergNEF (blog), accessed June 15, 2020, https://about.bnef.com/
new-energy-outlook.
“Costs,” International Renewable Energy Agency, accessed June 15, 2020, https://www.irena.org/costs.
BloombergNEF, “Falling Clean Energy Costs Can Provide Opportunity to Boost Climate Action in COVID-19 Recovery Packages,” BloombergNEF (blog), June 10, 2020, https://about.bnef.com/blog/falling-clean-energy-costs-can-provide-opportunity-to-boost-climate-action-in-covid-19-recovery-packages.
Cameron Hepburn, Brian O’Callaghan, Nicholas Stern, Joseph Stiglitz, and Dimitri Zenghelis, “Will COVID-19 Fiscal Recovery Packages Accelerate or Retard Progress on Climate Change?,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, May 8, 2020, graa015,
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/graa015.
Siddharth Dixit, Yewande Kofoworola Ogundeji, and Obinna Onwujekwe, “How Well Has Nigeria Responded to COVID-19?,”
Brookings (blog), July 2, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/07/02/how-well-has-nigeriaresponded-to-covid-19.

32 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

47
48
49
50

Simon Flowers, “How to Stop Nigeria’s Oil Industry Losing Relevance,” The Edge, December 4, 2018, https://www.woodmac.com/news/the-edge/how-to-stop-nigerias-oil-industry-losing-relevance.
Liam Denning, “OPEC’s Next Domino to Fall Could Be Nigeria,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2020-05-12/opec-s-next-oil-price-victim-could-be-nigeria.
Flowers, “How to Stop Nigeria’s Oil Industry Losing Relevance.”
Olatokewa Ayoade, “The Economic Repercussion of Coronavirus Pandemic on Nigerians,” Pulitzer Center, June 10, 2020,
https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/economic-repercussion-coronavirus-pandemic-nigerians.
International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook, April 2020: The Great Lockdown” (International Monetary Fund,
April 14, 2020), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020.
Emmanuel Abara Benson, “Nigeria Plans to Support Oil Price with Lower Production Cost per Barrel,” Nairametrics (blog),
March 12, 2020, https://nairametrics.com/2020/03/12/nigeria-plans-to-support-oil-price-with-lower-production-costper-barrel.
Deji Elumoye, “Nigeria: Senate Slams NNPC Over High Cost of Crude Oil Production,” allAfrica.com, June 2, 2020, https://
allafrica.com/stories/202006020330.html.
United Nations University Institute For Natural Resources In Africa, “Africa’s Development in the Age of Stranded Assets”
(Discussion Paper, UNU-INRA, 2019), https://i.unu.edu/media/inra.unu.edu/publication/5247/DIscussion-paper-Africas-Development-in-the-age-of-stranded-Assets_INRAReport2019.pdf.
UNU-INRA, “Africa’s Development in the Age of Stranded Assets.”
Natural Resource Governance Institute, “The National Oil Company Database,” (Natural Resource Governance Institute,
April 2019), 1–2, https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/national_oil_company_database.pdf.
Patrick R. P. Heller and David Mihalyi, “Massive and Misunderstood: Data-Driven Insights into National Oil Companies”
(Natural Resource and Governance Institute, April 2019), https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/
massive_and_misunderstood_data_driven_insights_into_national_oil_companies.pdf.
Natural Resource Governance Institute, “The National Oil Company Database.”
Fitch Ratings, “Nigerian Banks at Severe Risk from Oil Price Slump, Coronavirus,” Fitch Wire (blog), April 1, 2020, https://
www.fitchratings.com/research/banks/nigerian-banks-at-severe-risk-from-oil-price-slump-coronavirus-01-04-2020.
Fitch Ratings, “Nigerian Banks at Severe Risk from Oil Price Slump, Coronavirus.”
Babajide Komolafe, “Fitch Ratings Signals Downgrade of Nigeria’s Sovereign Rating,” Vanguard News (blog), March 11,
2020, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/03/fitch-ratings-signals-downgrade-of-nigerias-sovereign-rating/.
Joe Parkinson and Benoit Faucon, “Oil Slump, Coronavirus Create a Perfect Storm for Nigeria’s Economy,” Wall Street
Journal, April 27, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-slump-coronavirus-create-a-perfect-storm-for-nigerias-economy-11588000761.
Barbosa et al., “Oil and Gas after COVID-19.”
Elumoye, “Nigeria: Senate Slams NNPC Over High Cost of Crude Oil Production.”
Natural Resource Governance Institute, “The National Oil Company Database.”
International Energy Agency, “The Oil and Gas Industry in Energy Transitions,” World Energy Outlook special report (International Energy Agency, January 2020), https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-energy-transitions.
Filipe Barbosa, Giorgio Bresciani, Pat Graham, Scott Nyquist, and Kassia Yanosek, “Oil and Gas after COVID-19: The Day
of Reckoning or a New Age of Opportunity?,” McKinsey, May 15, 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/
our-insights/oil-and-gas-after-covid-19-the-day-of-reckoning-or-a-new-age-of-opportunity.
Bloomberg NEF, “New Energy Outlook 2019.”
Flowers, “How to Stop Nigeria’s Oil Industry Losing Relevance.”
Heller and Mihalyi, “Massive and Misunderstood: Data-Driven Insights into National Oil Companies.”
Climate Accountability Institute, “Top Twenty Rank 1965-2017,” accessed July 1, 2020, https://climateaccountability.
org/pdf/TopTwenty%20Rank%201965-2017.png; Matthew Taylor and Jonathan Watts, “Revealed: The 20 Firms behind a
Third of All Carbon Emissions,” The Guardian, October 9, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/09/
revealed-20-firms-third-carbon-emissions.
Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, “Open Letter from the CEOs of the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative,” OGCI (blog), May 26, 2020,
https://oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/ceo-open-letter-2020.
“Renewable Energy,” Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.
“The TPI Tool,” Transition Pathway Initiative, accessed July 20, 2020, https://www.transitionpathwayinitiative.org.
“Equinor,” Transition Pathway Initiative, accessed June 16, 2020, https://www.transitionpathwayinitiative.org/tpi/companies/equinor.

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT | 33

Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Adapted from “Petrobras,” Transition Pathway Initiative, accessed June 16, 2020, https://www.transitionpathwayinitiative.org/tpi/companies/petrobras.
Petronas, Energising Growth: Sustainability Report 2018 (Kuala Lumpur: Petronas, 2018), https://www.petronas.com/sites/
default/files/downloads/PETRONAS%20Sustainability%20Report%202018.pdf.
“Advancing human progress and economic development while tackling the global climate issue is the great challenge of
our time.” See Saudi Aramco, “Carbon Management,” accessed June 22, 2020, https://www.saudiaramco.com/en/creating-value/technology-development/globalresearchcenters/carbon-management.
Saudi Aramco, This is Energy, This is Aramco: Saudi Aramco Annual Report 2019 (2020), https://www.saudiaramco.com/-/
media/publications/corporate-reports/saudi-aramco-ara-2019-english.pdf.
“Carbon Capture, Utilization & Storage,” Saudi Aramco, accessed June 17, 2020, https://www.saudiaramco.com/en/making-a-difference/planet/carbon-capture-utilization-and-storage.
Algeria Future Energy, “Algeria Energy Summit 2018 Summary,” October 2018, https://www.algeria-future-energy.com/
wp-content/uploads/2019/02/FINAL-Algeria-Post-Event-Summary-2018.pdf.
“SONATRACH Participation in the 24th Edition of the World Energy Congress. 09-12 September 2019 Abu Dhabi,” Sonatrach, accessed July 1, 2020, https://sonatrach.com.
Science Based Targets, “Science Based Targets,” accessed July 20, 2020, https://sciencebasedtargets.org.
“Reducing GHG Emissions – Targets and Measures,” Equinor.
“Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR),” World Bank, accessed July 20, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/
programs/gasflaringreduction.
Ignatius Chukwu, “Revealed: Under-Reported Gas Flaring Leads to over $1bn Losses,” Businessday NG,” accessed July 27,
2020, https://businessday.ng/energy/oilandgas/article/revealed-under-reported-gas-flaring-leads-to-over-1bn-losses.
UNU-INRA, “Africa’s Development in the Age of Stranded Assets.”
“A Regulatory, Operational and Commercial Framework for the Utilization of Associated Petroleum Gas - Columbia Center
on Sustainable Investment,” Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, accessed July 20, 2020, http://ccsi.columbia.
edu/work/projects/a-regulatory-operational-and-commercial-framework-for-the-utilization-of-associated-gas.
Perrine Toledano and Belinda Archibong, “Nigeria Associated Gas Utilization Study” (Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment, September 2016), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/06/Nigeria-APG-Utilization-Study-Sept-2016-CCSI.pdf.
“Nigeria’s Flaring Reduction Target: 2020,” World Bank, accessed July 20, 2020, https://doi.org/10/nigerias-flaring-reduction-target-2020.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, “Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulation 2018,” Official Gazette 105, No. 88
(July 9, 2018), https://ngfcp.dpr.gov.ng/media/1120/flare-gas-prevention-of-waste-and-pollution-regulations-2018-gazette-cleaner-copy-1.pdf.
This World Bank initiative brings together governments, oil companies, and development institutions who agree to cooperate to eliminate routine flaring no later than 2030. See “Zero Routine Flaring by 2030,” World Bank, accessed July 11,
2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/zero-routine-flaring-by-2030.
“Equinor,” Transition Pathway Initiative.
“Our New Climate Roadmap,” Equinor, accessed June 15, 2020, https://www.equinor.com/en/how-and-why/climate.
html.
“Reducing GHG Emissions – Targets and Measures,” Equinor, accessed July 11, 2020, https://www.equinor.com/en/howand-why/sustainability/reducing-ghg-emissions.html.
“Petrobras: 5 Facts about Our Sustainable Operations That You Will like to Know,” Petrobras, accessed June 16, 2020,
https://petrobras.com.br/en/news/5-facts-about-our-sustainable-operations-that-you-will-like-to-know.htm;
and
Petrobras, 2019 Sustainability Report, https://api.mziq.com/mzfilemanager/v2/d/25fdf098-34f5-4608-b7fa-17d60b2de47d/9180c530-0eb6-e460-c56e-92441b216d65?origin=1.
Petrobras, 2019 Sustainability Report.
“Petrobras: 5 Facts about Our Sustainable Operations That You Will like to Know.”
Adapted from “Petrobras,” Transition Pathway Initiative.
Petronas, Energising Growth.
Sonatrach, Rapport Annuel 2018, https://sonatrach.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/RAPPORT-ANNUEL-2018.pdf.
Saudi Aramco, This is Energy, This is Aramco.
“Meet the Excellence behind Saudi Aramco’s Low Carbon Intensity,” Saudi Aramco, accessed July 14, 2020, https://www.
saudiaramco.com/en/magazine/elements/2020/low-carbon-intensity. Considering scopes 1 and 2 emissions only, Saudi
Aramco’s carbon intensity is comparatively low (Figure 5 above), but not low enough given the company’s proved liquid

34 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

Equipping the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for the Low-Carbon Transition

79

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

reserves—five times greater than those of the five largest oil majors combined. (Source: Will Kennedy and Kelly Gilblom,
“Saudi Aramco Pitches Itself as the Low-Carbon Investors’ Choice,” WorldOil, March 12, 2019, https://www.worldoil.com/
news/2019/12/3/saudi-aramco-pitches-itself-as-the-low-carbon-investors-choice.
“Renewable Energy,” Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. We note that turning land use into crops for biofuels could
actually generate emissions if this is at cost of deforestation and might pose problems for staple food production if not
done carefully. See Richard Martin and Michael Reilly, “The Problem with Biofuels,” MIT Technology Review, January 1,
2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/01/27/163572/the-problem-with-biofuels.
“Renewable Energy Division,” Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, accessed June 25, 2020, https://nnpcgroup.com/
Ventures/Pages/RenewableEnergy.aspx.
“Our New Climate Roadmap,” Equinor.
“Our New Climate Roadmap,” Equinor.
Petronas, Energising Growth.
Sonatrach, Rapport Annuel 2018.
Valérie Marcel, “National Oil Companies of the Future,” Responsabilité & Environnement 95, July 27, 2019, http://www.
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